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JURISDICTION 
This court has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment 
of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-
2(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Is a seller's interest under an executory real estate 
contract "real property" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 such 
that a judgment docketed against the seller after the contract 
is signed becomes a lien on the property? 
This issue presents a question of law, which this court 
reviews for correctness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988); Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern 
Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 78-22-1, which is set forth in the addendum, 
is determinative of the issue presented for review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The ULTA adopts the parties' statements of the case 
to the extent that they are consistent with each other and with 
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the Stipulated Facts, See Petitioners' Brief at 4-7; Respondents' 
Brief at 2-5; Record at 105-08. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The only interest that the Utah Land Title Association 
(ULTA) has in the outcome of this case is an interest in seeing 
that the law governing real estate transactions in this state 
is predictable and makes sense. The ULTA believes that the deci-
sion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case does the most 
to foster these goals. It is consistent with prior decisions 
of this court and the better reasoned authorities from other 
jurisdictions. (Point I.) It also makes the most sense as a 
matter of policy. (Point II.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH 
UTAH LAW AND THE BETTER REASONED AUTHORITIES. 
The ULTA has a strong interest in seeing that real 
estate transactions in this state are predictable. Because the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case is consistent 
with the prior, relevant Utah law, on which the ULTA and its 
- 2 -
members have relied, the ULTA believes that this court should 
uphold that decision.1 
Admittedly, this court has never considered the precise 
issue of whether a seller's interest under an executory real 
estate contract is "real property" within the meaning of Utah's 
judgment lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1. But this is 
not the first time the court of appeals has addressed the issue. 
In Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the 
court held that the execution of a binding earnest money agreement 
precluded a subsequent judgment against the seller from attaching 
to the property because, under the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, the seller held only a personalty interest in the property. 
See 746 P.2d at 805-06. 
Moreover, this court has considered the converse of 
the issue in this case, namely, whether a judgment lien attaches 
to a buyer's interest under an executory land contract, and has 
held that it does. See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254 
(Utah 1987); Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 
677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984). If a buyer's interest is real 
1
 A copy of the court of appeals' decision, Cannefax v. 
Clement, 786 P.2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is included in the 
addendum• 
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property, then, by "a parity of reasoning,•' the seller's interest 
must be personal property. See Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255 n.5.2 
Finally, this court has applied the doctrine of equi-
table conversion in analogous cases to conclude that the interest 
of the seller under an executory real estate contract is personal 
property, not real property as the Clements argue. See Jelco, 
Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 
739, 741 (1973) (condemnation award); Willson v. State Tax Comm'n 
fin re Estate of Willson1, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298, 1300 
(1972) (tax case); Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 
791 (1964) (action for rescission of certain conveyances).3 
The Clements have tried to distinguish these decisions 
on various grounds. It is not the ULTA's purpose to address 
* The Clements criticize the court of appeals for its 
reliance on Butler's "parity of reasoning" language. Petitioner's 
Brief at 24. However, the court of appeals7 reliance was not 
based on any aesthetic concern for symmetry but on this court's 
rationale. The doctrine of equitable conversion, which the court 
relied on in Butler, is based on the maxim that equity regards 
as done that which ought to be done. See, e.g., R. Boyer, Survey 
of the Law of Real Property 375 (3d ed. 1981). If the buyer's 
interest is real property because equity treats the contract as 
fully performed, then the seller's interest under what is deemed 
a completed contract cannot also be real property. 
3 Some authorities have distinguished between cases where 
the issue is one of characterization (i.e., whether a given 
party's interest is realty or personalty), and cases where the 
issue is who should bear the risk of loss, and have suggested 
that different rules should obtain for each. See, e.g., G. Nelson 
& D. Whitman, Land Transactions and Finance 93-95 (1983). Signi-
ficantly, both Willson and Allred, like this case, were character-
ization cases, not risk of loss cases. 
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these arguments on their merits. Admittedly, none of these prior 
decisions is controlling in this case. The ULTA has referred 
to them only to show that, absent controlling law to the contrary, 
one researching Utah law on the issue in this case would have 
had to conclude that Utah follows those jurisdictions that have 
applied the doctrine of equitable conversion to real estate con-
tracts and thus that Utah would not recognize a judgment lien 
against the seller's interest in property contracted to be sold. 
The prior, relevant Utah law on the subject is consistent with 
the court of appeals' decision and, in fact, has been relied 
on in real estate transactions in this state. If this court 
were to deviate from the result indicated by its prior decisions, 
it would inject a great deal of uncertainty into every contract 
for the sale of land in this state that is still executory at 
this time. 
Not only is the court of appeals' decision supported 
by the prior decisions of this court but also by the better 
reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions and other authorities 
on the subject. Historically, it appears that courts often al-
lowed judgments against a seller to attach to real property being 
sold under contract. See generally Annot., Right of Vendee Under 
Unrecorded Executory Land Contract as Against Subsequent . . . 
Judgment Rendered Against Vendor. 87 A.L.R. 1505, 1506-15 (1933), 
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and cases cited therein.4 However, for the reasons discussed 
in part II, infra, among others, many of the courts that have 
considered the issue recently have reached the same conclusion 
as the court of appeals did in this case. In addition to the 
cases cited by the court of appeals and by the respondents (see 
786 P.2d at 1381; Respondents' Brief at 17-20), see, for exam-
ple, Leioert v. R.C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355, 358-59 
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (applying New York law). 
Other modern authorities also tend to justify reliance 
on the court of appeals' decision. In addition to the authorities 
cited by the court of appeals and the respondents, see 3 R. 
Powell, The Law of Real Property, f 479[3] (1990 ed.); M. 
Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property S 4.8(e) 
at 366; Kratovil & Harrison, Enforcement of Judgments Against 
Real Property, 1951 U. 111. L. F. 1, 22-23 (1951). But see Note, 
Rights of a Judgment Creditor Against a Vendor or Vendee Following 
an Executory Contract for the Sale of Land, 43 Iowa L. Rev. 366, 
369-74 (1958) (arguing against application of equitable conver-
sion) . 
4
 The cases cited in the Annotation generally involved 
an unrecorded contract interest, so they are not entirely on 
point. Moreover, most are of nineteenth century vintage, and 
their continued vitality is questionable. The ULTA's own review 
of the cases indicates that the case law on this issue is fairly 
evenly divided. 
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II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION MAKES THE MOST SENSE 
AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
As mentioned, the ULTA has a strong interest in seeing 
that real estate transactions in this state are predictable. 
Of course, by conclusively resolving an open question of Utah 
law, this court will lend a degree of certainty and predictability 
to real estate transactions in this state whatever it decides. 
But the ULTA believes that, of all the avenues open to this court, 
by affirming the court of appeals this court will do the most 
to foster certainty, predictability and fairness in real estate 
transactions in Utah. 
The issue that this court must decide is simple and 
straightforward: Is a seller's interest under an executory real 
estate contract real property so that a judgment lien against 
the seller attaches to his interest under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
22-1? 
Similarly, the options available to this court are 
straightforward: The court can hold that the seller's interest 
is "real property" within the meaning of section 78-22-1; it can 
hold that the seller's interest is not "real property"; or it can 
adopt some middle ground. In reaching its decision, the court 
will find little help in the words of the statute or in its legis-
- 7 -
lative history.^ It must therefore reach the decision that makes 
the most sense for real estate transactions in this state. 
The Clements argue that a judgment lien should attach 
to the seller's interest to the extent the contract is executory 
at the time the judgment is docketed. As a fall-back position, 
they argue that whether or not a judgment lien should attach 
should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and 
that, because there are no equitable considerations in this case 
that would preclude their judgment lien from attaching, they 
should have a lien on the Cannefaxes' property in the amount of 
$54,464.94, the difference between the amount owing on the con-
tract immediately before closing and the amount of the prior 
encumbrances on the property. See Petitioners' Brief at 21. 
The Cannefaxes, on the other hand, argue that, under 
the doctrine of equitable conversion, a seller's interest under 
a real estate contract is personalty and that a judgment lien 
against the seller should therefore not attach to the property. 
Each of these positions is supported by certain policy 
considerations. The Clements' principal position—that a judgment 
lien attaches to the seller's interest to the extent the contract 
is executory at the time the judgment is docketed—is supported 
5 Section 78-22-1 has a long pedigree but a silent legi-
slative history. A predecessor of section 78-22-1 was enacted 
in territorial times, see Comp. Laws of Utah § 3414 (1888), long 
before Utah began officially recording the legislative history 
of enactments. 
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by the policy favoring the payment of creditors.5 If a seller's 
interest is real property, then the statute gives a judgment 
creditor security for the payment of his judgment and thus makes 
it more likely that he will get paid. 
But it does so at the expense of the other party to 
the contract—the buyer. That is because, under an installment 
contract, the seller's and the buyer's relative interests are 
constantly changing. With each payment the buyer makes, he ob-
tains a greater interest in the property, and the seller's in-
terest is accordingly diminished. 
Under the statute, a judgment lien attaches when it 
is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of the district 
court of the county in which the property is located. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-22-1. A buyer may not find out about the judgment 
until, as in this case, she has paid off the contract. Thus, 
b
 The Clements' backup position—that whether or not a 
judgment lien attaches depends on the equities of each case—is 
supported by the policy favoring resolution of disputes on their 
merits. Because no two cases are exactly alike, this position 
gives a court the flexibility it needs to reach what it thinks 
is the just result in a given case. But it does so at the ex-
pense of certainty and predictability in real estate transactions. 
If the parties to a transaction must always wait for a judicial 
determination as to whether or not the property is encumbered 
by a judgment lien, an installment land sale contract will cease 
to be "a commercially reasonable way of selling real estate." 
See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d at 1256. The ULTA submits 
that a bright-line rule that a seller's interest is never real 
property or always real property subject to a judgment lien is 
preferable to a case-by-case application of the doctrine of equi-
table conversion. 
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under the Clements' argument, through no fault of her own the 
buyer may end up with encumbered property when she thought she 
was getting clear title• 
A simple hypothetical will illustrate this point. 
Suppose S as seller and B as buyer enter into a contract for 
the sale of Blackacre. The contract calls for monthly payments 
of $1,000 for 10 years, for a total payment of $120,000. After 
30 months, B has paid $30,000, and S's interest in the property 
is $90,000. Suppose that in the thirtieth month C obtains a 
judgment against S for more than the value of Blackacre and it 
is promptly docketed in the county in which Blackacre is located. 
Under the Clements' theory, C now has a lien against the property 
for $90,000. Under the law, C does not have to take any action 
to foreclose his lien for up to eight years. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-22-1; Utah R. Civ. P. 69. B pays off the contract, but 
instead of getting clear title, as she thought she was getting, 
she ends up with a $120,000 property encumbered by a $90,000 
lien. The next month C files an action to enforce his judgment 
lien. Even though B has now paid $120,000 for Blackacre and S 
no longer has any interest in the property, because (unbeknownst 
to B) C docketed a judgment against S years before, B now runs 
the risk of losing three-fourths of her equity in Blackacre 
through no fault of her own. 
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The only way to avoid this result is for the buyer to 
check the judgment docket before making each payment under the 
contract. A buyer who does not, makes payments at his or her 
peril. 
One might think that an association of title companies 
would welcome such a result since it would greatly increase their 
work. But such a result would seriously limit transfers of real 
property by contract because no buyer would undertake the burden 
and attendant risks of monthly title checks if he did not have 
to. Moreover, by injecting so much uncertainty into land sales 
by contract, such a result would seriously threaten what has 
traditionally been a useful alternative to conventional financing, 
namely, the uniform real estate contract, making it harder for 
individuals who may be poor credit risks to obtain housing, fur-
ther hurting an already depressed real estate market. 
In short, although whatever this court decides will 
foster certainty and predictability to some extent, if the court 
were to reverse the court of appeals' decision, buyers under 
real estate contracts could never be certain that they would 
get what they had bargained for unless they regularly checked the 
judgment docket before making contract payments.^ Such a result 
/
 A prudent buyer could not protect himself by performing 
a title search before entering into the contract because the 
lien does not even arise and hence would not appear of record 
until after the contract is signed. 
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would impose an unwarranted and onerous burden on innocent third 
parties. As the court of appeals recognized, M[T]here is no 
better place for . . . predictability than in the transfer of 
real property and its effect on innocent third parties who must 
rely on some bright-line rule." 786 P.2d at 1382. 
The contrary position—that a judgment lien should 
attach to the seller's interest—is not justified by the policies 
the petitioners rely on. 
The petitioners first rely on the "strong public policy 
in favor of satisfaction of judgments." Petitioners' Brief at 
21. But the public's interest is in seeing that judgments are 
satisfied by the judgment debtor, not by some innocent third 
party. If the public's only interest were in seeing that judg-
ments were satisfied, regardless of the source of payment, the 
legislature could establish a fund for the payment of judgments 
to which all could contribute through taxes, thus spreading the 
burden more equitably rather than letting it fall disproportion-
ately on contract buyers. 
The Clements also adopt the points raised in Judge 
Bullock's dissenting opinion in the court of appeals. Judge 
Bullock criticized the automatic application of the equitable 
conversion doctrine on the grounds that it ignored the parties' 
intentions, namely, "a transfer of property when it is paid for, 
but not before." 786 P.2d at 1388 (Bullock, J., dissenting). 
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But the parties did not merely intend a transfer of property 
when paid for. They intended a transfer of unencumbered property. 
See Moore v. Bvers, 65 N.C. 240, 243 (1871) (the contract requires 
the seller to convey clear title when the money is paid; thus, 
foreclosure of a judgment lien "would defeat the contract of 
the parties"). Yet, under Judge Bullock's view, property that 
the parties intended would be conveyed free and clear may become 
encumbered despite the parties' best intentions and even without 
their knowledge. 
It is not enough to say, as Judge Bullock does, that 
the buyer can protect himself by checking the judgment docket. 
See 786 P.2d at 1389. The buyer must continually check the judg-
ment docket until the contract is paid in full. If he ever finds 
a judgment against the seller, he then must decide, at his peril, 
who to pay or else incur the expense of an interpleader action 
to relieve himself of the risks of an erroneous decision. It 
is "manifestly unjust" to impose such a burden on an innocent 
third party. See Kratovil & Harrison, supra p. 6, at 23; Comment, 
Are the Interests of Vendor and Purchaser Amenable to Creditors 
in Illinois? 1955 Univ. 111. L. F. 754, 756 (1955); Note, Lew 
on Interest of Vendor in Executory Contract for Sale of Land, 17 
Colum. L. Rev. 46, 47 (1917). 
Some of the inequity in the Clements' position could 
be alleviated if the court were to adopt a middle ground and hold 
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that a judgment lien only attaches to the seller's interest once 
the buyer has notice of the lien.8 But to do so the court would 
have to rewrite the statute, which clearly says that, M[f]rom the 
time the judgment . . . is docketed and filed in the office of 
the clerk of the district court . . . it becomes a lien upon all 
the real property of the judgment debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
22-1. See also 786 P.2d at 1390-91 (Bullock, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, such an approach sacrifices certainty and predictability 
in real estate transactions. Whether or not and when a buyer 
obtained actual notice of a judgment are questions of fact, which 
in many cases can only be decided by a trier of fact. If the 
parties to a transaction must always wait for a judicial deter-
mination as to whether or not the property is encumbered by a 
judgment lien, sales on contract will come to a screeching halt. 
b
 This is apparently the Clements' backup position. See 
Petitioners' Brief at 22-23 (suggesting that they are entitled 
to a lien only in the amount owed at the time the Barkers deli-
vered a warranty deed to Ms. Hodge, since by that time the 
Clements' judgment had been discovered). The ULTA believes that 
the Clements' argument is factually incorrect. The stipulated 
facts show that the judgment was not discovered until after 
closing, that is, after the sellers had been fully paid and the 
buyer had received (but not recorded) a warranty deed. See Record 
at 108 f 14. Thus, even if the judgment did not attach until 
the judgment was discovered, the seller had no interest to which 
it could attach. 
Significantly, even those cases that allow a judgment 
against a contract seller to attach to the property generally 
credit a buyer in possession with payments he makes to the seller 
after the judgment is docketed but before the buyer has actual 
notice of the judgment. See, e.g.. Annot., 87 A.L.R. at 1515, 
and cases cited therein. 
- 14 -
Judge Bullock also places great stock in "the need to 
efficiently enforce judgments." See 786 P.2d at 1389. However, 
just because a judgment creditor may not have a lien on real 
property that his judgment debtor has contracted to sell does 
not mean that the judgment creditor is left without a remedy. 
He can still garnish the payments due under the contract; he 
may be able to execute on the seller's interest in the contract, 
which is still considered personalty; and he may be able to reach 
the seller's interest by a creditor's bill in equity or through 
supplemental proceedings. Such remedies do not necessarily impose 
any additional burdens on the creditor, but they do protect the 
buyer by allowing him to make the payments according to the con-
tract until ordered by a court to do otherwise. 
CQNCLUglQN 
In conclusion, the ULTA submits that the court of ap-
peals' decision is most consistent with prior Utah law and the 
better reasoned authorities. Moreover, it makes the most sense 
as a matter of policy in that it protects innocent contract 
buyers, promotes certainty and predictability in real estate 
transactions, facilitates the alienation of property and makes 
title searches meaningful. The ULTA therefore respectfully re-
quests that this court affirm the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
- 15 -
DATED this 3As* day of January, 1991. 
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A D D E N D U M 
78-22-L Lien of judgment 
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed 
and filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes 
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from 
execution, in the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at 
the time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien. A 
transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or circuit court of this state, 
in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of 
the district court of any other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall 
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and effect as a 
judgment entered in the district court in such county. The lien shall continue 
for eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied or unless the en-
forcement of the judgment is stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient 
undertaking as provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment ceases. 
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the limits of the judicial reshaping of legis- broad and facially invalid.13 The subsec-
lative enactments by substantially rewrit- tion may not, therefore, be enforced 
ing the ordinance." Id. at 1388; u accord against Huber or anyone else. See Brock-
MiLSselman v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d ett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 
476, 477 (Ky.1986) C[C]learly the judiciary 503-04, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801-02, 86 L.Ed.2d 
lacks power to add new phrases to a stat- 394 (1985). 
ute to provide a new meaning necessary to
 T h e C O n v i c t i o n }s reVersed. 
render the statute constitutional."). 
We are well aware of our responsibility 
to construe statutes and ordinances so as 
to carry out legislative intent while avoid-
ing constitutional defects. See In re a 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 
(Utah 1988); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 
1088 (Utah 1981); see also Swoboda, 658 
S.W.2d at 25. However, we will not re-
write a statute or ignore its plain language 
in order to reach a constitutional construc-
tion. Willden, 768 P.2d at 458. In light of 
the municipality's use of the expansive 
term "abusive language" and its express 
intent to penalize speech that merely an-
noys, inconveniences, or alarms persons 
who may not even be its targets, unre-
stricted by the addressee's likely response, 
we decline to narrow the scope of Logan 
City Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) under the 
guise of judicial construction. Like the 
court in Conchito, 521 P.2d at 1388, we do 
not confuse the power to construe with the 
power to legislate. See also Musselman, 
705 S.W.2d at 477. It is for the municipali-
ty, not for this court, to fashion a narrowly 
drawn ordinance that criminalizes unpro-
tected speech as deemed necessary by city 
officials. 
Because Logan City Ordinance 12-8-
9(2)(D) is susceptible of application to sub-
stantial amounts of speech which, though 
perhaps vulgar or insulting, are none-
theless protected, it is constitutionally over-
12. In contrast, the Oklahoma court recently de-
clined to hold facially overbroad an ordinance 
expressly punishing "abusive or violent lan-
guage" that "disturb[sl the public peace or quie-
tude." The court concluded that the latter 
phrase in the ordinance, as previously con-
strued to require conduct that incites violence 
or tends to provoke others to break the peace, 
was within the boundaries set by Chaplinsky 
and later "fighting words" cases. Harrington v. 
DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
Raymond P.L. CANNEFAX and Debra 
Cannefax, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Donald W. CLEMENT and Ruth L. 
Clement, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 890292-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 2, 1990. 
Purchasers who had acquired property 
from contract vendee brought quiet title 
action against contract vendors' creditors. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Pat B. Brian, J., rendered summary judg-
City of Tulsa, 763 P.2d 700, 701 (Okla.Crim.App. 
1988). 
13. In light of our disposition of this case on the 
first amendment overbreadth issue, we need not 
reach the other important issues presented by 
Huber, including his claims that the ordinance 
is unconstitutionally vague and that, even if 
narrowly construed as punishing only "fighting 
words," the ordinance cannot constitutionally 
be applied to his speech. 
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ment in favor of creditors, and purchasers 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
J., held that, under doctrine of equitable 
conversion, vendors' retained interest un-
der the contract was not real property, and 
thus docketed judgment did not create a 
judgment lien against the property. 
Reversed with direction. 
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
J. Robert Bullock, Senior District 
Judge, filed a dissenting opinion. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>54 
"Equitable conversion" doctrine pro-
vides that, once parties have entered into a 
binding and enforceable land sale contract, 
purchaser's interest in the contract is said 
to be real property and vendor's retained 
interest is characterized as personal proper-
ty, and the rights of the parties are evalu-
ated as if the conveyance had been made. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Judgment e=»780(3) 
Under doctrine of equitable conversion. 
vendors' retained interest under a uniform 
real estate contract was not real property, 
and thus docketed judgment against the 
vendors did not create a judgment lien 
against the property. U.C.A.1953, 7S-22-1. 
Rodney M. Pipella (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Steven H. Lybbert (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for defendants and respondents. 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and 
BULLOCK \ JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Raymond and Debra Cannefax ("Canne-
faxes") appeal a summary judgment en-
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to t tali 
tered against them in their quiet title action 
and in favor of Donald and Ruth Clement 
("Clements"). In granting summary judg-
ment, the court held that a seller's retained 
legal title to real property under an exec-
utory land sale contract was "real proper-
ty" and, therefore, that a judgment docket-
ed by the Clements, the seller's creditors, 
was a lien against the property pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1987). We re-
verse. 
George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Bark-
er ("Barkers") were fee simple owners of 
the Lockhart Road Property at issue in this 
quiet title action. In 1981, the Barkers 
entered into a uniform real estate contract 
to sell their property to Diane Hodge ("Ms. 
Hodge") for $160,000. Ms. Hodge paid 
$40,000 to the Barkers at the time of the 
sale and she was to pay the balance over 
the contract term. On August 31, 1981, 
Ms. Hodge recorded a notice of her uni-
form real estate contract. 
Four years later, the Clements obtained 
a judgment against the Barkers for $70,526 
which was docketed in August 1985. The 
stipulated facts show no attempt by the 
Clements to execute against the Barkers' 
retained interest in the Lockhart Road 
Property nor any attempt to garnish the 
proceeds Ms. Hodge paid to the Barkers 
during the executory period of the uniform 
real estate contract. 
On September 25, 1985. Ms. Hodge paid 
the remaining amount due under her uni-
form real estate contract with the Barkers, 
satisfied prior obligations on the Lockhart 
Road Property, and the Barkers deeded the 
property to her. At the same meeting, Ms. 
Hodge sold the property to the Cannefaxes 
and gave them a warranty deed to the 
Lockhart Road Property. After the dual 
closings were completed, Surety Title con-
ducted a title search which disclosed the 
Clements' judgment docketed against the 
Barkers. This is the first mention in the 
stipulated facts of any actual knowledge of 
the Clements' judgment. 
Code Ann. § 7S-3-24U0) (1QS9). 
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Subsequently, the Clements obtained a 
writ of execution against the Lockhart 
Road Property then owned in fee simple by 
the Cannefaxes. In response, the Canne-
faxes brought this quiet title action. 
The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the Clements, holding 
their judgment was a lien on the Lockhart 
Road Property to the extent of $54,464.94, 
the amount which remained unpaid on the 
uniform real estate contract between their 
judgment debtors, the Barkers, and Ms. 
Hodge on September 25, 1985, the date the 
Barkers deeded Ms. Hodge the property. 
[1] We find the trial court's ruling con-
trary to the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion which is the law in Utah. Under the 
doctrine of equitable conversion, once par-
ties have entered into a binding and en-
forceable land sale contract, the buyer's 
interest in the contract is said to be real 
property and the seller's retained interest 
is characterized as personal property. R. 
Cunningham, W. Stoebuck, & D. Whitman, 
The Law of Property § 10.13, at 698 (1984). 
The rights of the parties are evaluated as if 
the conveyance had been made. H. McClin-
tock, McClintock on Equity § 106, at 284 
(1948) [hereinafter "McClintock on Equi-
ty'T-
The Utah Supreme Court first adopted 
the doctrine of equitable conversion in 
Allred v. Alfred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 
791 (1964). The court characterized the 
seller's interest under a land sale contract 
as personalty, stating, "[a]s a general rule 
an enforceable executory contract of sale 
has the effect of converting the interest of 
the vendor of real property to personalty." 
393 P.2d at 792. Again in In re Estate of 
Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 
(1972), the court clearly held that the inter-
est of a seller under a land sale contract 
2. The dissent ignores the previous precedent, 
and rather relies upon its interpretation of 
Reynolds v. Van Wagoner, 592 P.2d 593 (Utah 
1979), claiming the Utah court chose not to 
apply the doctrine of equitable conversion in 
this case because "it would have led to an ineq-
uitable result inconsistent with the contractual 
was personal property, not real property, 
for inheritance tax purposes. 499 P.2d at 
1300-01. 
The court applied the doctrine of eq-
uitable conversion in a condemnation con-
text in Jelco v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 
29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973). In 
Jelco, both the buyer and the seller under 
an executory land sale contract claimed a 
right to the increase in value of the land 
which had been condemned. The court 
held the buyer was the owner of the land, 
and thus he was entitled to the condemna-
tion proceeds. 511 P.2d at 741. In describ-
ing the status of the vendor under the 
contract the court stated, "the vendor . . . 
has only legal title. In regard to the pur-
chase price, what he is entitled to is to have 
it paid in accordance with the terms of the 
contract." Id. See also Bill Nay & Sons 
Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 P.2d 
1120, 1121 (Utah 1984) ("The interest of a 
purchaser under a real estate contract is an 
interest in real property "). 
Contrary to the claims made by the dis-
sent, the Utah Supreme Court has consist-
ently applied the doctrine of equitable con-
version characterizing the seller's interest 
under an executory land sale contract as 
personal property and the buyer's interest 
as real property.2 
The Utah Supreme Court recently ap-
plied the doctrine of equitable conversion in 
determining the rights of judgment credi-
tors under an executory land sale contract 
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 
(Utah 1987). In Butler, the court squarely 
held that the buyer's interest under the 
executory land sale contract was an inter-
est in real property to which judgment liens 
could attach. Justice Stewart stated: "The 
doctrine of equitable conversion character-
izes the seller's interest as an interest in 
personalty and not as one in realty, where-
intent of the parties." We disagree with the 
dissent's reading of this case. The Utah Su-
preme Court in Reynolds did not utilize the 
doctrine of equitable conversion because the 
case focused on abandonment of contractual 
rights not equitable conversion. Id. at 594. 
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as the vendee's interest under the exec-
utory contract is deemed an interest in 
realty." Id. at 1255. Further clarifying 
the doctrine of equitable conversion as it 
affects judgment creditors, he continued: 
Under the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, a vendee under a uniform real es-
tate contract obtains an equitable inter-
est in the land itself, even though the 
vendor retains the legal title. The 
vendee is said to convert the monetary 
interest that he has in the property to an 
interest in real estate so that he may 
invoke the powers of an equity court to 
compel specific performance of the real 
estate contract. By a parity of reason-
ing, the vendor under such a contract 
is deemed to have converted his interest 
in the land that is the subject of the 
contract to a monetary or legal interest 
Id. at n. 5 (emphasis added). The court 
further detailed the nature of the interest 
retained by the seller under a land sale 
contract, stating: 
Under an installment land sale con-
tract, the vendor retains legal title as 
security for the purchase pnee of the 
property. Oaks v. Kendall. 23 Cal. 
App.2d 715, 73 P.2d 1255 (1937); Marks 
v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 
P.2d 1199 (1979). Nevertheless, as a 
general proposition, the vendee is treated 
as the owner of the land 
The vendor's interest is similar to the 
security interest of a purchase money 
mortgagee. 
Id. at 1254-55 (emphasis added). 
The supreme court in Butler concluded 
the buyer under a binding executory land 
sale contract has an interest in real proper-
ty to which judgment liens may attach as 
to any other real property interest but sub-
ject to the seller's prior lien. "By a parity 
of reasoning," the court concluded that the 
seller's interest under the contract is mere-
ly the right to receive the proceeds under 
the contract secured by his retained legal 
title similar to the "security interest of a 
purchase money mortgagee." Id. at 1255. 
In Butler, Justice Stewart relied upon 
Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 
595 P.2d 1199 (1979). In Marks, the New 
Mexico court applied the doctrine of eq-
uitable conversion and held that the inter-
est retained by the vendor under a land 
sale contract is personalty and not real 
estate, and thus that a judgment docketed 
by a creditor of the seller during the exec-
utory period of the contract had no effect 
on the interest of a subsequent purchaser 
of the property. 595 P.2d 1201-02. 
[2] The dissent claims Butler supports 
its holding that a judgment lien docketed 
against the seller's interest under a uni-
form real estate contract survives as a lien 
against the land even though all proceeds 
have previously been paid to the judgment 
debtor-seller under the contract and the 
property has been deeded to a subsequent 
purchaser for value. We disagree. The 
dissent relies on the following language 
from Butler: "[thtj seller has] a contract 
right to . . . take back the vendee's inter-
ests if the vendee defaults. The vendor 
also has an interest . . . measured by the 
amount the vendee owes under the con-
tract." Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255 (citation 
omitted). This language is consistent with 
our view of the nature of the seller's re-
tained interest, not the dissent's. The sell-
er has retained legal title as security to 
insure that he or she receives the payments 
due under the contract; if the buyer should 
default, the seller's title will not be re-
leased to the buyer. This is the extent of 
the seller's retained interest—which, under 
the doctrine of equitable conversion, is not 
in the nature of real property such that 
liens can attach under section 78-22-1. 
This court's recent decision in Lach v. 
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah CtApp. 
1987), adopts our reading of Butler, In 
dicta, this court concluded that a judgment 
lien docketed against a seller's interest un-
der a uniform real estate contract did not 
affect the rights of the buyer under that 
contract. Id. at 805. Our language that 
**no judgment lien can be created by a 
judgment docketed against a seller after 
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the seller executes a binding earnest mon-
ey contract," id., however, needs amplifica-
tion. The docketed judgment does not be-
come a lien under the statute because the 
seller's retained legal title is not real prop-
erty. 
We believe Utah authority supports the 
following analysis of this case. The Bark-
ers entered into a uniform real estate con-
tract to sell the Lockhart Road Property to 
Ms. Hodge before the Clements docketed 
their judgment. Under the doctrine of eq-
uitable conversion, the Barkers retained 
only bare legal title to the property as 
security to receive the payment of the pro-
ceeds due from Ms. Hodge under the con-
tract. Thus, the Clements' docketed judg-
ment did not create a judgment lien against 
the Lockhart Road Property. 
The three jurisdictions relied upon by the 
dissent, Nebraska, Idaho and Oregon, have 
held that a judgment creditor of a contract 
seller will be given a lien in the property to 
the extent of the unpaid amounts due un-
der the contract. Monroe v. Lincoln City 
Employees Credit Union, 203 Neb. 702, 
279 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1979); First Sec. 
Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 
386, 389 (1967); Heidcr v. Dietz, 234 Or. 
105, 380 P.2d 619, 624 (1963) (en banc). 
This rule has been qualified, however, to 
allow a purchaser to continue to make pay-
ments pursuant to his contract until he is 
given actual notice of the judgment lien. 
The buyer is not required to search the 
records before he makes his payments un-
der the contract. Lacy, Creditors of Land 
Contract Vendors, 24 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 
645, 647 (1973) [hereinafter "Lacy, 24 Case 
W.Res.L.Rev. 645"]; Simpson, Legislative 
Changes in the Law of Equitable Conver-
sion by Contract, 44 Yale LJ. 559, 578 
(1935) [hereinafter "Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 
559"]. Furthermore, any lien acquired by 
the judgment creditor is "discharged by 
payment of the balance of the purchase 
money due although less than the amount 
of the judgment." Id.: see also 3 Am.Law 
Real Property § 11.29. at 86 (A. Casner ed. 
1952) [hereinafter "3 Am.Law Real Proper-
ty"]. 
Thus, not even the "rule" relied upon by 
the dissent support its position. There are 
no facts in the record to support a finding 
that Ms. Hodge had actual notice of the 
Clements' judgment before she paid all pro-
ceeds due the Barkers as sellers under the 
contract. 
Furthermore, the rule relied upon by the 
dissent is not the majority rule, nor the 
rule in Utah. The following jurisdictions 
have held that a judgment lien against the 
seller's interest is not an encumbrance on 
the buyer's property interest under a land 
sale contract: Marks v. City of Tucum-
cari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1979); 
Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 
501, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956); Stecker v. 
Snyder, 118 Colo. 153, 193 P.2d 881, 884 
(1948); Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. Ellis, 
180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162, 163 (1929); 
see also Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 nn. 
132, 133 and cases cited therein. 
More importantly, all of these vintage 
cases dealing with creditor's rights under 
an executory land sale contract turned on 
the peculiar facts presented and do not 
undertake a reasoned discussion of the ap-
plication of the doctrine of equitable con-
version in dealing with third party credi-
tors. Of more assistance are the commen-
tators who have written on the topic. 
These commentators criticize the approach 
taken by the dissent and approve the one 
advocated herein. 
Discussing the conceptual framework 
created by the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion in the judgment creditor context, one 
author states: 
The rights of creditors of the vendor or 
purchaser to reach the interest of their 
debtor in the land contracted to be sold 
or purchased depend in large part on the 
theory of equitable conversion. Since on 
that theory, the purchaser is regarded as 
owner of the land and debtor for the 
purchase money and the vendor as hold-
ing legal title as security for payment by 
the purchaser, it logically follows that 
creditors of the purchaser should be able 
to reach the land subject to the vendors 
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lien thereon, while creditors of the ven-
dor should be able to reach the land 
only to the extent of the vendor's secur-
ity interest. 
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29, at 83 
{emphasis added). See also McChntock on 
Equity § 106, at 286. 
Several commentators have explicitly en-
dorsed the cases that refuse to allow a 
vendor's judgment creditors to acquire a 
lien as against the purchaser under an ex-
ecutory land sale contract even though the 
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser 
has actual knowledge of the judgment lien. 
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29, at 86; 
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579; Lacy, 24 
Case W.Res.LRev. 645, 662. "This works 
no injustice upon the creditors, who may 
proceed by garnishment to reach the pur-
chase money or by bill for equitable execu-
tion to reach both purchase money and 
vendor's lien." 3 Am.Law Real Property 
§ 11.29, at 86. Another commentator 
states: 
[I]t is difficult to see why the purchaser's 
knowledge of a judgment against . . . his 
vendor, should impose upon him the ne-
cessity of paying otherwise than in ac-
cordance with his contract. Some courts 
have held, and, it would seem with sound 
reason, that the vendor's judgment credi-
tors acquire no lien as against the pur-
chaser even though the purchase price is 
unpaid and the purchaser knows of the 
judgment. This works no injustice on 
the creditor, who may proceed by gar-
nishment to reach the purchase money or 
by bill for equitable execution to reach 
both purchase money and the vendor's 
lien. 
Simpson, 44 Yale LJ . 559, 579 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Still another scholar concludes that even 
if one considers that the seller's judgment 
creditor's lien can attach, the creditor 
should not have any right to receive pay-
ments upon mere attachment of a judg-
ment lien but only upon an execution sale. 
Lacy, 24 Case W.Res.LRev. 645, 662. 
The dissent also alludes to several policy 
considerations which it claims support its 
holding. We discuss each in turn. The 
dissent rejects application of the doctrine of 
equitable conversion under a uniform real 
estate contract claiming that it "is hardly 
what most parties to a real estate sale 
contract have in mind. The more straight-
forward notion of such a contract envisions 
the land as changing hands only after the 
price is paid." However, executory land 
sale contracts are used by and are general-
ly intended by the parties as long-term 
financing devices similar to mortgages or 
trust deeds. Therefore, it is not inconsist-
ent that the effect of a judgment docketed 
against the seller under a uniform real 
estate contract should be the same as one 
docketed against a mortgagee or trust deed 
beneficiary. Furthermore, there are abso-
lutely no facts to support the dissent's view 
of the parties' intentions in this case. The 
dissent candidly admits that the Barkers 
did not intend that their judgment creditors 
could acquire a superior position to their 
buyer, Ms. Hodge, under the uniform real 
estate contract. 
The dissent further admits that "[ena-
bling creditors to have access to the seller's 
title to the property may lessen somewhat 
the predictability of real estate transac-
tions." However, it answers this concern 
by chiding Professor Langdell and his disci-
ples for espousing certainty and predict-
ability in legal doctrines. We believe there 
is no better place for Professor Langdell's 
"legal geometry" and predictability than in 
the transfer of real property and its effect 
on innocent third parties who must rely on 
some bright-line rule. 
The dissent concludes the problems cre-
ated for contract buyers by its rule are not 
substantial as "a prudent buyer can still 
assure his title by checking the judgment 
docket to determine if creditors' claims ex-
ist." We believe the dissent places an un-
reasonable burden on the buyer, one that 
for practical purposes will destroy the com-
mercial feasibility of property sales by 
long-term contracts. Under the dissent's 
view, a buyer would be required to check 
the judgment docket before making each 
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monthly payment to the seller. We believe 
the burden is more equitably placed on the 
judgment creditor who can enforce his 
judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 64C, 64D or 
69. 
Finally, we do not see how the "equi-
ties," as claimed by the dissent, are with 
the Clements as judgment creditors in this 
case. The issue is not whether the Clem-
ents should have recourse on their judg-
ment but rather the procedural form of 
their remedy and the person who can be 
compelled to satisfy their judgment. It 
was the Clements who sat on their rights 
failing to pursue their remedies. It is not 
inequitable that as a result they cannot 
collect their judgment against a subsequent 
innocent purchaser.3 
In conclusion, we reverse the summary 
judgment granted to the Clements and or-
der the trial court to enter summary judg-
ment in favor of the Cannefaxes quieting 
title to the Lock hart Road Property in 
them. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
The doctrine of equitable conversion runs 
counter to some real property law concepts 
and my law practice observations of the 
expectations of parties to real estate deals. 
If I had been involved in the decisions to 
take the route leading to adoption of the 
doctrine, 1 would not have favored the trip. 
At this point, there is no junction, and the 
principle of stare decisis requires that we 
continue the journey until our supreme 
court chooses to change course. In the 
meantime, we need to maintain a stable 
direction in the law for the benefit of those 
involved in real estate transactions. 
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior 
District Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. As a general 
proposition, I do not have great difficulty 
3. There are no allegations that the Cannefaxes 
as buyers acted in bad faith in purchasing the 
properly at issue. For cases where "sweetheart" 
contractual deals are entered into to defraud 
v. CLEMENT Utah 1383 
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in applying the doctrine of equitable con-
version to the buyer's inier-st under a in-
stallment land sale contract. I do, how-
ever, have insurmountable difficulty in ap-
plying it to the seller's interest to the ex-
tent that the purchase price is unpaid, 
which is the result under the majority opin-
ion. I would, therefore, hold precisely op-
posite to my esteemed colleagues and af-
firm the district court. 
This case was heard in the district court 
on stipulated facts and dismissed on a mo-
tion for summary judgment. From the lim-
ited scope of those proceedings, the single 
issue before the district court and on ap-
peal is whether a contract seller's retained 
title is real property to which judgment 
creditors' liens can attach pursuant to sec-
tion 78-22-1 to the extent of the unpaid 
price, or whether that title is personalty by 
reason of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, to which judgment creditors' liens 
cannot attach. The majority's conclusion 
that the seller's retained title is personalty 
appears to me to be contrary to the case 
law generally, to run counter to public poli-
cy, to presume facts not in evidence, and is 
based upon grounds never argued here or 
below. I respectfully opine that the majori-
ty misinterprets the applicable case law in 
Utah and most other jurisdictions and 
reaches a result that has nothing to recom-
mend it in terms of public policy, other 
than the pursuit of purely theoretical sym-
metry, that is to say, that if the buyer's 
interest might be regarded as personal 
property, then it invariably must follow for 
reasons of symmetry that the seller's inter-
est is personal property, even though the 
seller has not been fully paid and has not 
parted with title. I explain first how the 
majority's opinion conflicts with the rele-
vant Utah cases, and then turn to consider-
ations of public policy. 
Utah Case Law on Equitable Conversion 
A Utah appellate court has never square-
ly held, until this case, that a judgment 
creditors, there is a remedy available under the 
Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1989). 
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against the seller and duly docketed as 
section 78-22-1 provides does not create a 
lien against the seller's legal title to land 
agreed to be sold under an executory in-
stallment contract because the seller's re-
tained title was not real property. There 
are cases in which the Supreme Court has 
relied on the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion in very different contexts; for exam-
ple, in holding that the seller of property 
later condemned was entitled only to the 
contract amount * or in holding that the 
seller's interest was taxable as personal 
property.2 However, the interests at stake 
in estate taxation and eminent domain are 
very different from those at stake in debt-
or-creditor relations, and the majority's ref-
erences to dicta restating the notion of 
equitable conversion in such cases provide 
no compelling reason for applying eq-
uitable conversion to preclude a judgment 
lien. The purely obiter recitations of the 
general concept of equitable conversion are 
no authority for applying it here. Mere 
definition of a concept does not justify its 
application; we could as well define a judg-
ment lien and thereupon insist on vindicat-
ing the lien in this case. 
The most thorough elucidation to date by 
the Utah Supreme Court of the scope and 
limits of equitable conversion is found in 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). A footnote in Butler at page 1255, 
quoted in the majority opinion, defines the 
concept of equitable conversion, and it is 
upon that definition that the majority prin-
cipally relies. However, Butler stops far 
1. Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court, 29 
Utah 2d 472. 511 P.2d 739 (1973). 
2. Willson v. State Tax Commission, 28 Utah 2d 
197, 499 P2d 1298 (1972). 
3. Butler accordingly squares with the law of 
most jurisdictions that have considered the 
question. See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Rog-
ers, 91 Idaho 654. 429 P.2d 386 (1967) ('The 
majority rule is that a judgment lien against a 
vendor after the making of the contract of sale 
extends to all of the vendor's interest remaining 
in the land and binds the land to the extent of 
the unpaid purchase price.); Heider v. Deitz, 234 
Or. 105. 380 P.2d 619 (1963). This majority rule 
is further discussed later in this opinion. 
short of requiring equitable conversion in 
every conceivable instance, and, in my 
analysis of it, concludes contrary to the 
majority opinion in this case.3 Butler 
clearly holds that the buyer's interest is 
real property to which a judgment lien at-
taches subject to the seller's retained legal 
title,4 but it is not all-encompassing in forc-
ing universal adoption and application of 
the "parity of reasoning" for which the 
majority contends. The main point of the 
majority opinion seems to be that, because 
the buyer's interest is real property, the 
seller's interest must "logically" be person-
al property. However, Butler's descrip-
tion of the "parity of reasoning," the logi-
cal symmetry that underlies equitable con-
version, is not an unqualified, universal 
endorsement of it. 
Butler's general, introductory restate-
ment of the concept of equitable conversion 
is, according to Butler itself, not a univer-
i>.*l verity that must be applied slavishly in 
every conceivable instance, without regard 
to the merits of such an application. But-
ler recognizes that equitable conversion re-
sults in a characterization of the buyer that 
"is not wholly accurate,"5 and further 
notes that equitable conversion does not 
prevent a judgment docketed against the 
seller from becoming a lien on the seller's 
title to the land.* 
After stating that judgment creditors' 
liens against a buyer's equitable contractu-
al interest are not extinguished by an "as-
signment, sale, or rescission," the Butler 
5. 740 P.2d at 1255. Butler further notes that 
equitable conversion operates to treat the buyer 
as owner of the land only "as a general proposi-
tion." I recognize that in many situations, it 
makes good sense to regard the prospective, 
conditional performance of the contract as if it 
were an accomplished fact; however, this case 
does not present such a situation. 
6. "[A] judgment lien against the vendor's inter-
est [is not] extinguished by the vendor's sale of 
that interest to a third person." 740 P.2d at 
1258. 
4. 740 P.2d at 1255-56. 
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opinion continues: "Nor for that matter, is our inquiry. 
a judgment lien against the vendor's inter-
est extinguished by the vendor's sale of 
that interest to a third person."7 The 
Clements argue, and I agree, that this 
statement clearly shows that the Supreme 
Court considers the seller's retained title to 
be real property, since judgment liens at-
tach only to real property, not to personal 
property, pursuant to section 78-22-1. 
The majority views the seller's interest 
as, at most, a lien. In this regard, it is true 
that Butler analogizes the seller's interest 
to a purchase money mortgage, but Butler 
is careful to point out it is really no mere 
lien; rather, it is legal title to the land, 
albeit subject to a conditional promise to 
convey at a future date.* Legal title to 
land is not only within the definition and 
plain meaning of "real property" in section 
78-22-1, but also it is the very archetype of 
what real property is.9 
Butler clearly recognizes thai the seller 
retains legal title, and that is where the 
analytical usefulness of the analogy to a 
lien ends. The seller's retained legal title 
is indeed similar to a lien or mortgage, in 
that it permits the seller to regain the land 
if the buyer defaults. However, the fact 
that the retained title may function like a 
lien in certain circumstances is far from 
saying that it is identical or equivalent to a 
lien for all purposes.10 We do not have a 
case here in which a seller recovers proper-
ty from a delinquent buyer, and therefore, 
the lien analogy has little utility in this 
particular situation. Rather, this is a case 
in which a third party seeks to realize a 
judgment out of the seller's asset, and the 
legal nature of that asset is the object of 
lTtah 1385 
In this comext, it is quite 
immaterial that the buyer could lose his 
interest in a forfeiture that in some ways 
operates as a lien foreclosure. What is 
important for present purposes is that the 
Barkers held legal title, and, although they 
had agreed to part with it at a later date if 
Hodge performed her obligations, they still 
held legal title when the Clements docketed 
their judgment. Consistent with Butler, a 
judgment lien would therefore attach to 
that title to the extent of the unpaid bal-
ance of the contract price. 
In respectful contrast to Judge Jackson's 
concurring opinion, I am convinced that 
stare decisis does not compel the result 
reached by the majority. Dicta in Lach v. 
Deseret Bankn may have expressed a 
view on the subject, but dicta are not hold-
ing, and only a holding of the court need be 
followed under the principle of stare deci-
sis.*'1 The precise question that is squarely 
presented in this case was an open question 
in Utah case law until this case. The prior 
adoption in our case law of the general 
notion of equitable conversion does not 
mean that it must apply in this case; when-
ever a doctrine of such broad scope is em-
braced, it must be fine-tuned and excep-
tions must be carved out to prevent injus-
tice in the many varied applications of the 
doctrine. Some of the limitations on eq-
uitable conversion were explained in the 
Butler case, and in the case before us now, 
Butler clearly indicates that equitable con-
version should not be applied here. 
Deficiencies in Rationale 
This is the first time a Utah appellate 
court has squarely held that a docketed 
7. Butler, 740 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis added). 
8. See 740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6. 
9. See Restatement of Property § 10 comment c 
(1936). 
10. Justice Stewart clearly recognized the limita-
tions of the lien analogy in the Butler opinion 
when he wrote: "The term vendor's lien* seems 
to have stuck even though it is inaccurately used 
before the vendor parts with the title. Until 
then, it is not, in fact, a lien at all, but rather a 
retained interest in the land that is derived from 
the vendor's retention of the fee title." 740 P.2d 
at 1256 n. 6. 
11. 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1988). 
12. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206. 210 (1929); 
Salt Lake City v. Suiter, 61 Utah 533. 216 P. 234, 
236-37 (1923). 
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judgment does not create a lien against the 
seller's retained title to real property under 
a contract of sale. Since we here lay down 
a precedent, I think it is important to exam-
ine the rationale and public-policy impacts 
of that holding. 
The doctrine of equitable conversion is 
the notion that the seller of a specifically 
enforceable contract to convey land is 
deemed to own primarily ,3 an interest in 
personal property, and the buyer's interest 
under the contract is characterized as real 
property.14 However, while that notion 
leads to a sensible result in some situa-
tions, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that such a characterization of the 
parties' interests is not generally what they 
have in mind. The more straightforward 
notion of such a contract envisions the land 
as changing hands only after the price is 
paid; until then, the seller still owns the 
land and the buyer is in the unfulfilled 
process of acquiring .'• '* I* order to un-
derstand why a legal doctrine such as eq-
uitable conversion could be acknowledged 
at all, when its effect is to transform realty 
into personalty, automatically and in dis-
regard of the intention of the parties, a 
brief excursus into our legal history may 
be helpful. 
The English common law developed 
along the lines of certain specific "writs" 
issued by the king's courts to address cer-
13. The "bare legal title" retained by the seller is 
sometimes said to be held in trust for the buyer, 
see, e.g., In re Highberger's Estate, 468 Pa 120, 
360 A.2d 580 (1976); In re Krotzsch's Estate, 60 
I11.2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975); Smith v. 
Tang, 100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), or to 
be a constructive lien to secure payment of the 
price, see Oaks v. Kendall, 23 Cal.App.2d 715. 73 
P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1937). The term "lien," 
however, is actually something of a misnomer, 
as the Utah Supreme Court explained in Butler, 
740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6: 
The term "vendor's lien" . . . is inaccurately 
used before the vendor parts with the title. 
Until then, it is not, in fact, a lien at all, but 
rather a retained interest in the land that is 
deri\ed from the vendor's retention of the fee 
title. 
14. See generally 3 American Law of Property 
62-64 (Casner, ed.. 1952); R. Cunningham, Vv. 
Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property 
tain specific wrongs. Pursuant to an early 
statute, problems that did not fit within the 
scope of an existing writ could not be 
remedied by the king's courts, although the 
courts in time became somewhat adept at 
stretching the scope of the prescribed writs 
by analogy.,€ Still, many grievances, such 
as a simple breach of a contract, for exam-
ple, were for centuries not effectively re-
solved by the rigid, stultified rules of the 
common law.17 
When relief was not available at common 
law for a perceived wrong, the aggrieved 
person at first petitioned the king directly 
to intervene and do justice. The kings 
came to refer such petitions to their chan-
cellors to be decided according to con-
science and equity, rather than by the rigid 
rules of the common law. The chancellors 
eventually developed a system of courts, 
procedure, and substantive law separate 
from the common law, which came to be 
known by the word "equity." 
One of the remedies commonly employed 
by the courts of equity was specific per-
formance, an order directing the defendant 
to perform a specific act in furtherance of 
a contractual obligation. In a contract for 
the sale of land, a recalcitrant seller could 
be ordered in equity to specifically perform 
the contract, that is, to actually convey the 
land. If he failed to do so, he could be 
penalized for contempt.,K 
698-701 (1984); H. McCliniock, McClintock on 
Equity 284-88 (1948); 4 J. Pomeroy & S. Sym-
ons, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 472-80 
(1941); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Ju-
risprudence 485-92 (1918). 
15. 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 193-94 
(1960). 
16. D. Dobbs, Remedies 28-35 (1978). 
17. Id.; L. Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Contract 
Law 63-66 (1972). 
18. The earliest origins of equitable conversion 
have been traced to trust concepts, independent 
of specific performance. Da\is, The Origin of 
the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion by Contract 
25 Ky.LJ. 58 (1936); Simpson. Legislative 
Changes in the IMW of Equitable Conversion by 
Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559 n. 3 (1935). The 
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One of the time-honored maxims of equi-
ty was that it "regards as done that which 
ought to be done." Applying this maxim to 
land sale contracts came to mean that if 
specific performance could be granted on 
the contract, the contract could be con-
sidered as if it had been fully performed. 
The seller could therefore be treated as 
having conveyed the property and received 
the price, and the buyer as having received 
the property. The seller was therefore 
deemed in equity to hold personal property, 
and the buyer, real property. This deem-
ing was, of course, a legal fiction; the 
contract was fully performed only in the 
chancellor's imagination. The reality was 
that a deed would be delivered and the 
seller would consider himself no longer the 
owner when the sale had been consummat-
ed by receipt of the full price.1* 
When the English legal tradition was 
transplanted to America, the doctrine of 
equitable conversion came along with it. 
In 1905, the American legal scholar Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell systematized it 
elaborately, and it almost seems as if Lang-
dell placed his philosophical mark upon the 
doctrine, making it into a "legal geometry" 
or a "heaven of juristic conceptions."20 
For Langdell, law was a science, whose 
data in the English tradition were the prior 
decisions of courts.21 To the legal scien-
tist, cloistered in the library that was his 
current formulation of the doctrine, however, is 
firmly linked to the specific enforceability of 
the contract, perhaps due to the oft-cited formu-
lation by Lord Eldon in a case seeking specific 
performance, Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves.Jun. 265 
(1802). 
19. The fictional character of the rule is apparent 
in the fact that equity would not invoke it to 
give the purchaser any real incidents of owner-
ship before the time set for performance. H. 
McClintock, McClintock on Equity 295 (1948). 
20. 3 American Law of Property 64 (Casner, ed., 
1952). 
21. Address by C.C. Langdell delivered Novem-
ber 5, 1886, reprinted in Law Quarterly Review 
123. 124 (1887). 
22. For example, Langdell noted in his casebook 
v. CLEMENT Utah 1387 
377 (UtahApp. 1990) 
laboratory, it was irrelevant whether the 
rule extracted from the ca^es proauced a 
result that was in reality unjust or at odds 
with common sense. What mattered was 
not whether the rule was a good one but 
rather whether it was the rule.22 
This rather mechanistic, wholly abstract 
view of the law has fallen upon evil days in 
recent decades. Sociological jurisprudence 
and legal realism waged a war of commen-
tary on the application of fixed rules with-
out regard to fairness in an individual case 
or to social policy. In particular, equitable 
conversion came to be explained as a 
"name given to results reached on other 
grounds."23 No longer was it a set of 
substantive rules describable in clauses be-
ginning with "if" and "then"; rather, it 
was simply a shorthand method of describ-
ing what came after the "then." There 
was still little thought of adding an express 
"because . . . , " or of explaining the reasons 
for either the substantive rule or the result 
in a specific case. 
This inattention to the reasons for eq-
uitable conversion led to some roundhouse 
critiques of the doctrine. Harlan Stone 
debunked it in a 1913 article.24 Several 
other writers also denounced, and uniform 
legislation was proposed to counteract, its 
effect of placing the risk of casualty loss 
on the buyer during the executory period.r> 
Some cases hedged in relying on the eq-
that acceptance is effective on dispatch, regard-
less of whether it is received, had been criticized 
as leading to unjust and absurd results. "The 
true answer" to that criticism was. according to 
Langdell, "that it is irrelevant." C.C. Langdell, 
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts 
995-96 (2d ed. 1879). 
23. Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv.L. 
Rev. 813, 832 (1920); see also Stone, Equitable 
Conversion by Contract, 13 CoIum.L.Rev. 369 
(1913). 
24. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 
Colum.L.Rev. 369 (1913). 
25. E.g., Vannemann, Risk of Loss in Equity be-
tween the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate 
and Transfer of Tide, 8 Minn.L.Rev. (1924); 
Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executor}' 
Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 Harv.L. 
on contracts that the "mailbox rule" holding Rev. 106 (1895). 
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uitable conversion doctrine, declaring that 
it would be invoked only when it led to a 
fair result.26 Contrary to the majority's 
claim, my thorough reading of the modern 
commentary on equitable conversion gener-
ally reveals little enthusiasm for universal 
application of the doctrine and no per-
suasive reasoning to support its application 
in this case. 
The scholarly criticism of the blind appli-
cation of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion has, however, been only partially suc-
cessful in preventing its misuse in the 
courts. Leading commentators have re-
cently noted that "decisions [on equitable 
conversion] often seem adamant in their 
unwillingness to discuss the underlying pol-
icy issues; equitable conversion almost be-
comes a substitute for thinking about the 
real questions in the case." 27 There is no 
justification for ignoring what is actually 
happening in a case and what the parties' 
clash of interests is really all about. In-
voking a talisman such as "equitable con-
version" to give a name and ostensible 
legitimacy to a rule without a rationale is a 
jurisprudential cop-out, and exposes society 
to potential danger from rules that have 
drifted from their public policy moorings. 
In my opinion, courts have a responsibility 
to continually scrutinize the law we apply, 
26. E.g., Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S.E.2d 
875 (1948); In re Seifert's Estate, 109 N.H. 62, 
242 A.2d 64, 33 A.L.RJd 1276 (1967); National 
Bank of Topeka v. Saia, 154 Kan. 740, 121 P.2d 
251 (1942). 
27. R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, 
The Law of Property 699 (1984). 
28. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 
P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah 1987); B. Cardozo, 
The Nature of the Judicial Process 98-142 (1921). 
Holmes expressed both the compunctions and 
the necessity felt by a person who must dis-
charge this responsibility in saying that he "hes-
itate[s] to affirm universal validity for his social 
ideals" and "may be ready to admit that he 
knows nothing about an absolute best in the 
cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing 
about a permanent best for men. Still it is true 
that a body of law is more rational and more 
civilized when every rule it contains is referred 
articulately and definitely to an end which it 
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring 
that end are stated or are ready to be stated in 
words." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. 
L.Rev. 457, 468-49 (1897). 
particularly juiicially-crcated law su^h as 
equitable conversion, in order to weed out 
defects in the law as it has been handed 
down to us and to keep it consistent with 
evolving social policy and conditions.28 
Viewing the policies and practical rea-
sons for equitable conversion, I firmly be-
lieve that it is not a rule that should be 
applied as a matter of course in every 
instance. Rather, it describes a result in 
which the seller's interest is deemed to be 
essentially personalty and the buyer's in-
terest to be realty. In reaching that result, 
the court should endeavor, as with any 
contract, to give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.29 While apply-
ing equitable conversion automatically for 
every question involving a land sale con-
tract may foster easy predictability, it 
would nevertheless in many instances dis-
regard or frustrate what the parties intend-
ed their contract to accomplish, which is a 
transfer of property when it is paid for, but 
not before. The contract in this case, for 
example, clearly contemplates a transfer of 
ownership by deed after all installments 
have been paid. 
One involuntary consequence30 of the 
seller's retention of title to the property is 
that his creditors may reach it in satisfac-
29. 1 A. Corbin, COT bin on Contracts 1-3 (1963); 
see also John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Corp., 743 P.2d 1205. 1207 (Utah 1987); Lund-
Strom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 17 Utah 2d 114, 
405 P.2d 339 (1965); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 
Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958). 
30. We recognize that the buyer and seller in this 
case, like most, probably did not intend for a 
judgment lien to attach to the seller's interest 
shortly before the seller conveyed to the buyer, 
and they would have precluded the lien, if that 
were possible. However, the law also recog-
nizes the rights of a party's creditors to reach 
assets in satisfaction of their judgments, without 
regard to the debtor's preferences in the matter. 
Therefore, once it is clear that they have, by 
their intent, retained a property interest, the 
rights of creditors to reach that interest operate 
without regard to what the debtor-promisor and 
his promisee may have intended. 
CANNKFAX v. CLEMENT 
Cite as 786 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1990) 
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tion of their claims a g a ^ t H:y*. Er* Liing 
creditors to have access to tne seller's title 
to the property is thought by the majority 
to lessen the predictability of real estate 
transactions. However, a prudent buyer 
can still assure his title by checking the 
judgment docket to determine if creditors' 
claims exist. In this and most sales, the 
buyer has recourse against the seller if 
title is encumbered, and, if the encum-
brance is serious, may rescind the sale.31 
If, however, the buyer ignores the encum-
brance, he proceeds at his peril, unless he 
can prove himself to be a bona fide pur-
chaser or invoke statutory protection such 
as the recording act.32 Neither Hodge nor 
the Cannefaxes attempted to rescind, or 
asserted that they are bona fide purchasers 
or protected under the recording act. In 
these circumstances, there is nothing 
wrong with leaving the loss to fall upon the 
buyer, who is able to discover in advance 
the faults in the title and take corrective 
action. 
In determining the legal effect of a con-
tract, therefore, the intent of the parties M 
should carry far more weight than a legal 
fiction, however deep in tradition the fic-
tion's roots. People have a right to make 
contracts and to have their lawful contrac-
tual intentions fulfilled, and they cannot 
fairly be expected to make contracts with a 
thorough knowledge of the oblique way in 
which nine centuries of equitable jurispru-
dence may twist and "convert" the mean-
ing of their intentions.34 In holding that 
the buyer's and seller's interests are equi-
tably converted, the majority is oblivious to 
31. Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 
1984); Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 
P.2d 662 (Utah App. 1987). 
32. See Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398-99 
(Utah 1983). 
33. Contrary to the majority's view, the intent of 
the parties is clear from the face of their con-
tract, and, under the parol evidence rule, extrin-
sic evidence is unnecessary and inadmissible. 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
34. Other equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, 
laches, unclean hands, etc. are not subject to 
the face of the contract itself, which pro-
vides that the seller will convey the real 
property when the price is received, and 
not before. It was undisputed that the 
price was not received when the Clements' 
judgment was docketed. 
In my view, the majority also places in-
sufficient value in the need to efficiently 
enforce judgments. They intimate that the 
Clements could have executed on their 
judgment, but ignore the fact that their 
execution was judicially restrained in this 
case. It is also unclear in Utah law that 
the Clements have anything on which they 
could execute, without a judgment lien. At 
common law, execution cannot be levied on 
a chose in action,35 and, although that com-
mon law rule has been changed by statute 
in many jurisdictions, there is no applicable 
Utah statute. Thus, by reducing the sell-
er's interest to a mere contract receivable, 
the majority leaves the judgment creditor 
without a clear, sure means of reaching the 
seller's contract interest under our law, 
other than by garnishing each payment as 
it accrues. Enforcing a duly entered judg-
ment thus becomes a cumbersome process 
of having a writ issued and served before 
each installment is paid. 
Most jurisdictions that have considered 
this question have weighed the policy con-
siderations as I do. Contrary to the asser-
tion of the majority, the scholars studying 
this question all conclude that the majority 
of jurisdictions hold that a judgment lien 
attaches to the seller's interest in a con-
tract for the sale of real property.36 
More persuasive, however, than the re-
sults of any interstate judicial poll are the 
this same criticism. Rather, they serve to carry 
into effect the fair and reasonable intentions of 
the parties. 
35. 33 CJ.S. Executions § 28 at 158-59 (1942). 
36. Eg., Monroe v. Lincoln City Employees Credit 
Union, 203 Neb. 702, 279 N.W.2d 866 (1979); 
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 
P.2d 386 (1*967); Heider v. Deitz. 234 Or. 105, 
380 P.2d 619 (1963). Surveys of case law on 
point include R. Cunningham, \V. Stoebuck & D. 
Whitman, The Law of Property 701 (1984); 
Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 
Case W.Rcs.L.Rev. 645, 646 (1973); 3 Am. Law 
of Property 11.29 at 85 (1952). 
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competing- needs to recognize the parties' 
contractual intent and to provide an effec-
tive means of enforcing judgments. Con-
versely, there is no real reason favoring 
equitable conversion in this setting, other 
than perhaps a wish for abstract symmetry 
or elegantia juris, which could incline one 
to the notion that, since the buyer has real 
property under equitable conversion princi-
ples, the seller must conversely have per-
sonal property for all purposes, including 
the attachment of judgment liens.37 How-
ever, to give way to such a wish in dis-
regard of the parties' intent and of the 
need to enforce lawful judgments is sheer 
formalism, a glorification of abstraction for 
abstraction's sake. 
Potential Defenses Not Raised 
The Cannefaxes' position here and in the 
district court has consisted only of an at-
tempt to invoke equitable conversion to 
prevent the Clements' judgment lien from 
attaching. The Cannefaxes have not as-
serted any defenses against the enforce-
ment of the Clements' lien, once it at-
tached. Ordinarily, there would be little 
need to mention defenses never raised by 
the parties, but in this case, I believe the 
majority has, in effect, given some weight 
37. It is perhaps ironic thai equity, which began 
as an effort to overcome the constricting for-
malism of the common law writ system, came 
to have such a penchant for wholly abstract 
logical symmetry. Some of this devotion to 
abstract symmetry has already been discarded; 
the old equitable doctrine of mutuality of reme-
dy, for example, which held that an equitable 
remedy could be granted to the plaintiff only if 
the defendant, under like, hypothetical circum-
stances, could obtain the same remedy, has 
been totally discarded. Utah Mercur Gold Min-
ing Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 l/iah 
249. 134 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1943) ('The remedy of 
one should not depend upon the hypothetical 
case of what another could demand if the situa-
tion were different."); Genola Town v. Santa-
quin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930, 934 (1938). 
38. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 
421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973). 
39. Max v. Emerson, 52 Or. 262, 96 P. 454 (1908); 
Wehn v. Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N.W. 13 (189S); 
see R. Cunningham, VV. Stoebuck & D. Whit-
man, The Law of Property 702 (1982); Lac>, 
to those potential defenses. They pre-
sume, for example, that the Cannefaxes 
are bona fide purchasers, and they also 
view the Clements as having failed to per-
form a duty to give actual notice to the 
Cannefaxes, in order to "perfect," in a 
sense, their lien against the Cannefaxes. 
However, the Cannefaxes' bona fides and 
lack of actual notice are unproven facts 
that might have been material to defensive 
arguments that were never raised. Since 
the Cannefaxes had the burden of avoiding 
the lien in order to quiet title,3* judgment 
against them is correct, even though there 
was no apparent inquiry into either actual 
notice, the Cannefaxes' knowledge of the 
judgment or lack of it, or into their bona 
fides in any respect. 
As the majority also points out, several 
jurisdictions have held that the judgment 
lienor cannot recover from the buyer any 
installment payments made in the ordinary 
course of contract performance without ac-
tual notice of the existence of the judgment 
lien.3* These holdings are rooted in con-
cern that the buyer not be required to 
check the judgment docket every time an 
installment payment is made; such would 
be an "intolerable inconvenience."40 In-
stead, the buyer is permitted to continue 
paying installments, which are credited 
against the price, until the buyer is given 
Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case 
W.Res.L.Rc\. at 646-47; A. Freeman & E. 
Tunic, A Treatise on the I AW of Judgments 965 
(5th cd. 1905). 
40. Mover v. Hmman, 13 N.Y. 180 (1855). Such 
concern certainly has its place in adjudication, 
and Utah case law has recognized that simple 
fairness and "the equities" may properly be con-
sidered in reaching a decision. Jacobson v. Ja-
cobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976); but see 
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985) 
("equitable powers are narrow/y bounded"). 
However, an unstructured, unguided inquiry 
into "whatever's fair" invites subjectivity and 
inconsistent, uncertain results, and the often 
elusive and ethereal nature of "fairness" would 
leave little effective means, other than litigation, 
for resolving disputes. I would therefore prefer 
to see such equitable concern take a more struc-
tured form, such as laches. Under that doc-
trine, a lienor would be barred from enforcing 
the lien if the lienor delayed in asserting his 
rights while his adversary performed reason-
ably and lnnoccntK u> his detriment. See Bor-
land v. Chandler.'IIS P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
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actual, not merely constructive, notice of 
the lien. I have no quarrel with such a 
conclusion, but there is absolutely no occa-
sion to reach it in this case, since there is 
no indication in the stipulated facts wheth-
er or not the Cannefaxes had actual notice 
of the lien at a time when they could have 
averted consummation of the sale. The 
Cannefaxes, in seeMng to quiet title 
against the Clements, had the burden of 
going forward with evidence showing that 
the lien was unenforceable.41 All section 
78-22-1 requires for a lien to attach is 
entry of the judgment and docketing in the 
proper county. The judgment creditor is 
not required to do anything more, such as 
give actual notice to a contract buyer, and 
to require more would run contrary to sec-
tion 78-22-1 } 2 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I believe there is no ques-
tion but that the buyer's interest in an 
executory land sale contract may be char-
acterized as real property under the fiction 
of equitable conversion for the purpose of 
the attachment of the buyer's judgment 
creditors' liens. However, the cases, in-
cluding Butler, do not hold that because 
the buyer's interest may be considered real 
property for that purpose, it must then 
necessarily follow that the seller's retained 
title is personalty to which the liens of the 
seller's judgment creditors cannot attach. 
In my opinion, the rule to be deduced 
from Butler and the cases cited therein is 
that the seller's retained title in an install-
ment land sale contract was, is, and re-
mains real property to the extent of the 
unpaid balance of the purchase price for 
the purposes of the attachment of liens of 
the seller's judgment creditors. Further, 
by reason of the fiction of equitable conver-
sion, the buyer's interest may also be char-
acterized as real property, limited only by 
the right of the seller to receive the pur-
41. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 511 P.2d at 
146. There are several other potential argu-
ments which, in an appropriate factual setting. 
the buyer could have asserted against the lien. 
However, we have neither facts nor argument to 
enable us to determine, for example, whether 
the title company handling the closing was neg-
ligent and could have reversed the transaction 
by returning escrowed deeds and money when 
. HAFEN Utah 1391 
391 (UtahApp. 1990) 
chase price and the performance of other 
terms of the contract. 
I recognize that the recording statutes 
and bona fide purchaser considerations are 
significant and may be overriding in a giv-
en case.43 However, no such matters ap-
pear from the stipulated facts in this case 
and none were raised or argued in the 
district court or here on appeal. 
From the cases, as well as an examina-
tion of the historical underpinnings of the 
equitable conversion fiction, which is not a 
doctrine of universal application, I am re-
grettably compelled to respectfully dis-
agree with the majority's opinion, and I 
would affirm the trial court. 
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